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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2003, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, one of the foremost experts on extradition, proposed a "radical new approach" to current
extradition practices.' Among the problems identified which compel the changes he suggested, Professor Bassiouni singled out the
"4stagnation" in the current system. Issues that have existed since
the first U.S. extradition case are still being grappled with and
* Mark A. Summers, Professor of Law, Barry University, Dwayne 0. Andreas School
of Law, B.A., Washington and Jefferson College; J.D., West Virginia University; LL.M
(International Law), Cambridge University. I would like to thank the Barry University
School of Law for its support in the writing of this article. I would also like to thank my
research assistant, Theresa Daniels, for her invaluable help.
1. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reforming InternationalExtradition: Lessons of the Past for a
Radical New Approach, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 389 (2003).
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U.S. extradition legislation "has not been comprehensively overhauled" since 1848.2 He argued for replacing the current treatybased practice of extradition that is hampered by "undue formalities" with a new system predicated upon international comity 3 and
a comprehensive approach to U.S. legislation "on all modalities of
international cooperation in penal matters."14 The result should be
more "efficient and expeditious extradition proceedings . .. consistent with the application of the same norms and standards the
judiciary must apply in ordinary criminal cases." 5
One such formality, peculiar to international extradition cases,
is the rule of specialty. 6 Specialty prevents the requesting state
from trying the defendant for an offense other than one for which
he was extradited and requires that he be given a reasonable time
to leave the country before being prosecuted for any other offense
committed prior to the extradition. 7 Since "few foreign countries"8
have "the complex criminal laws the United States has enacted," 9
specialty would preclude prosecutions for more sophisticated or
esoteric crimes' 0 for which surrender was not ordered. And if', as
2. Id. at 401.
3. See LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (4th ed. 1990)
("Oppenheim writes of 'the rules of politeness, convenience and good-will observed by
States in their mutual intercourse, without being legally bound by them.").
4. Bassiouni, supora note 1, at 402.
5. Id. at 401.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 477
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The rule is also sometimes called "speciality," a term
which some scholars prefer. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Extradition Between France and
the United States: An Exercise in Comparative and International Law, 13 VAND J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 653, 706 n.187 (1980). This article will, however, use the term "specialty"
since that is generally the way the rule is referred to in the United States. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, § 477.
7. M. CHERIF BAssiouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 429 (3d ed. 1996).
8. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 404.
9. Id.
10. Consider, for example, cybercrime. cybercrime is perpetrated by using global electronic
networks.
Criminal
Justice
Resources:
Cybercrime,
http://staff.lib.msu.edu/harris23/crimjust/cybercri.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2010). Cybercriminals operate anonymously, are not hampered by national boundaries, and are notoriously hard to catch. See, e.g., Michael Coren, Experts: Cyber-crime bigger threat than
cyber-terror
(Jan.
24,
2005),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/01/18/cyber.security/index.html (reporting that in
2003 the then fastest spreading computer worm, the Sapphire or Slammer, infected 90% of
the world's vulnerable hosts within ten minutes of the first infection and concluding
"[tihere is no conceivable way for system administrators to respond to threats of this
speed."). Consequently, cybercrime presents formidable challenges for law enforcement.
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF TRE INTERNET
(2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm. When computers are used
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many scholars insist, specialty is a rule of customary international
law,"' this would be true whether extradition took place pursuant
to a treaty or the more flexible, comity-based system advocated by
Professor Bassiouni. 12 This article therefore will consider whether
specialty is a rule of customary international law, binding upon
states even in the absence of a treaty. 13
Part II of the article will trace the origin of the rule of specialty
in U. S. extradition law. Part III will analyze the seminal case,
United States v. Rauscher,14 and will argue that its conclusion that
specialty was customary law should be discounted. Part IV will
consider U.S. practice since Rauscher to show that it has never
been consistent with Rauscher's holding that specialty is a rule of
customary law.' 5 And, Part V will conclude that specialty has
never been more than a rule of international comity and that it
should no longer be followed by the United States in either treaty
or comity-based extraditions.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF SPECIALTY IN U.S. EXTRADITION
LAW

A.

Background

Despite the fact that "an incipient modern extradition treaty"
existed as early as 1376, the "modern" practice of extradition via
bilateral treaty did not become well established until the eight-

merely as communications devices in order to commit ordinary crimes, such as the illegal
sale of prescription drugs, controlled substances, alcohol, and guns, as well as other crimes
like fraud, gambling, and child pornography, the President's Working Group found that
existing laws are "generally sufficient" and established as a basic principle that "online and
offline conduct should be treated consistently and in a technology- neutral way." Id. The
same cannot be said for those crimes where "the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
a computer's information or services is attacked," using techniques such as "hacking" and
"denials of service." Id. In these instances, special statutes, which other countries unaffected by the problem are unlikely to have enacted, are required to deal with previously
unknown phenomena. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
11. Professor Bassiouni has written that "[sipecialty ... is so broadly recognized in
international law and practice that it has become a rule of customary international law. As
such, it is binding upon the United States." BAsSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 430.
12. See Fiocconi v. Att'y Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 479 (2d cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1059 (1972) (specialty applied to comity-based extraditions).
13. See supra text accompanying note 11; see cases cited infra notes 62, 132 and accompanying text.
14. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
15. Rauscher also held that specialty was a treaty-based rule which could be invoked by
individuals in U.S. courts, i.e., that the rule is self-executing. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430-31.
That aspect of Rauscher's holding is beyond the scope of this article.

4
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eenth century. 16 Prior to that time, the practice of one state seeking the return of a fugitive from another usually occurred when
the fugitive had committed some sort of political offense (e.g. a
treasonous or seditious act), as opposed to an "ordinary" crime.' 7
Because of the political nature of these offenses, rulers zealously
guarded their right to grant asylum to political fugitives,' 8 and
attempts by "a foreign power to obtain jurisdiction over any person
within another power's territory represented as least a potential
treat [sic] to the sovereignty of the requested ruler."' 9 As the practice of extradition shifted from seeking the return of political enemies to obtaining jurisdiction over criminals, the rules of specialty
and double criminality developed in order to ensure that extraditions were not sham political renditions. 20
The rule of specialty in its modern form appeared for the first
time in an extradition treaty between France and Saxony in
1850.21 The first U.S. treaty to contain the rule was the 1868
agreement with Italy. 22 At that time, absent such a provision, the
United States insisted on the right to try an extradited fugitive for
any offense, whether extradition had been granted for it or not. 23
It was this insistence that led to a suspension of the United
States-Great Britain Extradition Treaty of 184224 in the cases of
Lawrence and Winslow.25

16. Christopher L. Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern
France and the United States: A Brief History, 4 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 39, 50 (1981);
see also William Beach Lawrence, The Extradition Theaty, 14 ALB. L. J. 85, 87 (1876) (stating that the term extradition in its modern sense was first used in 1791).
17. Blakesley, supra note 16, at 49; see also Lawrence, supra note 16, at 87 (stating
that ancient treaties "were not treaties for the administration of ordinary criminal jurisprudence but related to political matters as affecting the security of the State, involving
high treason and sometimes other felonies.").
18. See Lawrence, supra note 16, at 86 (stating that asylum is "an inviolable attribute
of independent sovereignty").
19. Blakesley, supra note 16, at 45 (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 49-50.
21. Id. at 52.
22. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON ExTR&DITION AND) INTERSTATE RENDITION,
194 (1891).
23. 2 DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 758-59 (Francis
Wharton, ed., 2d ed., Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing OfficelSS7) [hereinafter DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW].
24. Convention on Boundaries, the Slave Trade and Extradition, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. X
Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572 [hereinafter Webster-Ashburton Treaty].
25. 1 MOORE, supranote 22, at 211.
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The Cases of Lawrence and Winslow 26

Pursuant to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Lawrence was extradited from Great Britain to the United States in 1875.27 Despite the fact that he had been extradited for forgery, the United
States insisted that it could try Lawrence for smuggling. 28 In the
meantime, the United States requested the extradition of Winslow
who had been charged with forgery in Massachusetts. 29 Great
Britain responded by refusing to extradite Winslow until it received a guarantee from the United States that Winslow would be
tried only on those charges for which he was extradited. 30 The
United States refused, claiming that in the absence of a treaty
provision, it did not have the power to "give any stipulation or
make any arrangement whatever as to the offences for which he
should be tried when returned to the justice of the State against
whose laws he may have offended." 31
Great Britain argued that the rule of specialty applied, even
though the treaty did not contain such a provision. Some of its
arguments were that specialty was an "'essential principle of extradition, . . . as practised' by Great Britain"; 32 that there was an
"implied understanding" between the two countries that the rule
applied in cases under the 1842 treaty; 33 that it would violate U.S.
26. See generally Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal Courts:
Making Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 71, 114-30 (1993-94).
27. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 202-06.
28. Id.
29. Letter from Hamilton Fish to Gen. Schenck (Feb. 17, 1876), in U.S. DEP'TOF STATE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 205 (New York, Kraus 1966) (1876) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS].
30. See Letter from Hamilton Fish to Gen. Schenck (Feb. 21, 1876), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 205-06 (describing a conversation Secretary Fish had with
Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary); Telegram from General Schenck to Secretary
Fish (March 2, 1876), in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 206 ("Lord Derby . .. declines to give up Winslow unless promise is made by law or by arrangement that he shall be
tried only for the extradition crime.").
31. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 199 (quoting FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, at
233).
32. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 200 (quoting Letter from Lord Derby to Colonel Hoffman, acting Charg6 d'Affaires of the United States in London (June 17, 1876)).
33. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 197; see also Letter from Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr.
Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 760. At
least one contemporary commentator agreed with Great Britain: "To suppose that under
these provisions the extradited person could be tried for any other crime than that for
which he was extradited, would be to render nugatory all the provisions which confine the
treaty, by naming them, to specified offenses." Lawrence, supra note 16, at 90. The British position was hardly farfetched given the fact that the implementing legislation of both
countries contained identical language implying that there was a reciprocal understanding
that those surrendered would be tried only for extradited offenses. See Letter of Lord

6
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law to prosecute Lawrence for a crime for which extradition had
not been granted; 34 and that specialty was a rule of customary

international

law. 35

In response, the United States stuck to its

position that specialty was exclusively a treaty-based right:
Derby to Mr. Hoffman (May 4, 1876), in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 227. The
British statute enacted in 1843 provided:
[That such persons as should thereafter be extradited to the United States should be
delivered "to such person or persons as shall be authorized in the name of the United
States to receive the person so committed, and to convey him to the United States, to
be tried for the crime of which such person shall be accused."
Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 707 (1878) (emphasis added) (quoting
Extradition Act, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 76 (1843) (Eng.)); see also Lawrence, supra note 16, at 95.
The U.S. statute of August 12, 1848 provided:
That it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State, under his hand and seal of office, to
order the person so committed to be delivered to such person as shall be authorized,
in the name and on behalf of such foreign government, to be tried for the crime of
which such person shall be so accused, and such person shall be delivered up accordingly... .
Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302 (emphasis added).
34. Letter of Hamilton Fish to Mr. Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), in DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 761. Secretary Fish's response to the British was
that "[t]he act of August 12, 1848 ... does not affect or limit the rights of the two Governments on the question." Id. at 763. It merely "provides the machinery, and prescribes the
general mode of procedure, but does not assume to determine the rights of the United
States, or of any other state, which are governed wholly by the particular provisions of the
several treaties." Id. at 763.
Lawrence, meanwhile, had petitioned the Attorney General of the United States,
arguing that an 1869 statute also barred his prosecution:
Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign government to an agent of the
United States, for the purpose of being brought within the United States and tried for
any crime of which he is duly accused, the President shall have power to take all necessary measures for the transportation and safe-keeping of such accused person, and
for his security against lawless violence, until the final conclusion of his trial for the
crimes or offences specified in the warrant of extradition, and until his final discharge
from custody or imprisonment for or on account of such crimes or offences, and for a
reasonable time thereafter, and may employ such portion of the land or naval forces
of the United States, or of the military thereof, as may be necessary for the safekeeping and protection of the accused.
1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 204-05 (emphasis added). The Solicitor General perfunctorily
rejected Lawrence's arguments: "[Nbo ground has been laid for an order to discharge the
petitioner from further prosecution upon the criminal matters specified in the petition." 15
Op. Att'y Gen. 500, 513 (1875); see also 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 204. William Beach
Lawrence, writing in 1877, disagreed: 'The act of 1869, for the protection of a person extradited under a treaty (Revised Statutes § 5275), I consider . .. sufficient to meet the case
of a trial for an offense for which the prisoner was not surrendered." William Beach Lawrence, Extradition, 16 ALB. L.J. 361, 364 (1877).
35. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 203; See also Letter of Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr.
Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 23, at 761 ("it
would be a violation -... of the general laws of extradition of all countries"). According to
Moore, at that time there was "[a] mong writers on international law ... an almost uniform
concurrence in the opinion that a person surrendered for one offence should not be tried for
another until he shall have been replaced within the jurisdiction of the surrendering state
or had an opportunity to return thereto." 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 217-219. As a rule of
customary international law, specialty would have been applicable in the courts of the
United States as "a special form of the common law." MARK W. JAN15, AN INTRODUJCTION
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[I]f the surrendered fugitive is to find immunity from trial for
other than the offense named in the warrant of extradition, he
must find such immunity guaranteed to him by the terms of
the treaty, not in the act of Congress. The treaties which contain the immunity from trial for other offenses have been
celebrated since the date of the act of 1848.36
The U.S. insistence that the 1848 statute did not commit it to
the rule of specialty in a treaty-based extradition with Great Britain was dubious at best, since the 1848 statute predated the first
U.S. treaty containing the rule of specialty by twenty years. 37 A
more plausible interpretation is that the 1848 statute governed
extraditions to and from the only two states with which the U.S.
then had extradition treaties-Great Britain and France. 38 This
conclusion is strengthened, especially with regard to Great Britain, by the reciprocal character and nearly identical language in
39
the implementing legislation of the two countries.
The actual practice under the treaty was also hotly disputed.
The United States claimed that in both countries "surrendered
fugitives have been tried for other offenses than those for which
they were delivered." 40 Britain distinguished one of the cases
cited by the United States as a "private prosecution" which thereTO INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (4th ed. 2003).

Not long after the Lawrence-Winslow contro-

versy, the Supreme Court of the United States famously stated, "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination." The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
36. Letter from Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), in DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 763-70.
37. See 1 MOORE, suspra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. Letter from Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), in DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 763. The 1848 statute was the first U.S. extradition
legislation. Between 1794, when the United States entered into Jay's Treaty with Great
Britain, and 1848, extradition took place "without the benefit of national legislation." Bassiouni. supra note 1, at 397. The conclusion that the statute was intended to implement
the 1842 treaty is strengthened by its title, which could only have referred to the U.S. treaties with Great Britain and France: "An Act For giving Effect to certain Treaty Stipulations between this and foreign governments, for the Apprehension and delivering up of
certain Offenders." Ch. 167, 9 Stat. at 302. While not referring to the rule of specialty,
Congressman Ingersoll, who moved passage of the bill in the House of Representatives,
stated, 'The object of this bill was to appoint officers and to authorize others to carry out
the provisions of the treaties with France and England." CONG. GLOBE 868, 30th Cong., 1st
Sess. 868 (1848). Likewise, in the Senate, "Mr. Dayton referred to the existing treaties on
the subject with Great Britain and France." CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 1008
(1848).
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

40. Letter from Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Hoffman (Mar. 31, 1876), in DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 763.

8
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fore did not indicate its departure from the rule of specialty.41 As
to the others, where the defendants were extradited to the United
States from Canada, Great Britain responded that it had no
"knowledge" of a case in which a defendant was "surrendered by
England for one offense and tried by the United States for a dif-

ferent

one." 42

The matter ended in a stalemate of sorts. Only after the treaty
was suspended 43 for six months and "many" fugitives escaped justice, 44 did Great Britain agree to resume extraditions. It did so "as
a temporary measure, until a new extradition treaty can be concluded," since by then it appeared that Lawrence would not be
tried for any other offenses. 45 Great Britain agreed to the resumption although it had never received an assurance that Winslow
would not be tried for non-extradited offenses. 46 Privately, however, its commitment was conditioned on the United States continuing to forbear such prosecutions. 47
The resumption of relations under the 1842 Treaty was far from
"temporary." A new treaty would not take effect until 1889.48 In
the meantime the issue would arise again, this time ending up in
the United States Supreme Court.
III. UNITED STATES v. RAUSCHER: SPECIALTY AS CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

The Rauscher Decision

William Rauscher was extradited from Great Britain to the
United States pursuant to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty to stand
trial for the murder of one member of the crew of a ship of which
he was an officer. 49 Instead he was tried and convicted of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the crewmember, an offense

41. Letter from Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Hoffman (May 22, 1876), in DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 772.
42. Id.
43. President Grant suspended the treaty in a message to Congress on June 20, 1876.
Message from Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States, to Congress (June 20,
1876), in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 786-89.
44. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 211 n.3.
45. Id. at 210.
46. Id. at 210-11.
47. Semmelman, supra note 26, at 128.
48. Extradition Convention between the United States and Her Britannic Majesty,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. Ill, July 12, 1889, 26 Stat. 1508.
49. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409.
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not included in the treaty.50 In deciding that Rauscher could not
be tried for an offense other than the one for which he had been
extradited, Justice Miller largely adopted the positions advanced
by the British regarding the rule of specialty in the Lawrence and
Winslow cases. 51 Thus, specialty was implicit in a treaty that
enumerated the offenses for which one could be extradited; 52
prosecution in derogation of the rule would violate the two statutes adopted by Congress to implement U.S. extradition treaties,
which are "conclusive upon the judiciary of the right conferred
upon persons brought from a foreign country into this under such
proceedings"; 5 3 and the rule was "recognized public law" from
which the treaty "did not intend to depart."54
The first two prongs of Rauscher's specialty reasoning-that it
is implicit in a treaty with enumerated offenses and that it was
reflected in U.S. statutes-while plausible are not as ineluctable
as Justice Miller had asserted. 55 And, in any case, the incorpora-

50. Id. Unlike in the Lawrence and Winslow cases, there apparently was no diplomatic
protest by Great Britain, since neither the Supreme Court's opinion nor Moore mention
one. See also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (noting that "no
importance was attached to whether or not Great Britain had protested the prosecution of
Rauscher").
51. This is not terribly surprising given Justice Miller's citation to, and praise of, William Beach Lawrence's articles supporting the British position in the Lawrence and Winslow cases. See Raouscher, 119 U.S. at 416. Justice Miller lauded Lawrence as a "very
learned authority on matters of international law..."Id.
52. "Indeed, the enumeration of offenses ... is so specific and marked by such a clear
line in regard to the magnitude and importance of those offenses, that it is impossible to
give any other interpretation to it than that of the exclusion of the right of extradition for
any others." Id. at 420. And, if a "party is properly liable for any other offense than that
for which he was demanded and which is described in the treaty[] [tihere would . .. seem
to be no need of a description of a specific offense in making the demand." Id. at 421. Finally, the fact that the treaty provides that the party whose extradition is demanded is
entitled to a hearing at which it must be proved that he committed one of the seven enumerated offenses "leavels] no reason to doubt that the fair purpose of the treaty is that the
person shall be delivered up to be tried for that offense and no other." Id. at 422-23 (alteration in original).
53. Bauscher, 119 U.S. at 424.
54. Id. at 420.
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 424. An equally
plausible conclusion was that by enumerating offenses the United States and Great Britain
intended merely to insure that extradition for political offenses would not take place. When
President Tyler submitted the Webster-Ashburton Treaty to the Senate for ratification, he
explained that "[fln this careful and specific enumeration of crimes, the object has been to
exclude all political offenses, or criminal charges arising from wars or intestine commotions." President John Tyler, Message to the Senate (Aug. 11, 1842), in 1 MOORE, supra
note 22, at 214. See also Semmelman, supra note 26, at 93 (concluding that "the rationale
behind the enumeration of offenses, from the perspective of both the United States and
Great Britain, was to protect political offenders, not to incorporate the much broader principle of specialty into the Treaty").
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tion of some form of the rule of specialty in nearly every U.S. extradition treaty since Rauscher56 greatly reduces the importance of
its conclusion that specialty is implicit in treaties with enumerated offenses. Similarly, the statutory rule of specialty 57 applies
by its terms only to the "offenses specified in the warrant of extradition" and thus does not confer the right in non treaty-based renditions.5 8 Thus the focus of this article is Justice Miller's finding
that specialty was a rule of customary international law because,
if correct, the rule would bind the United States, even if the fugi-

tive were surrendered as a matter
B.

of comity. 59

The Status of the Rule of Specialty in 1842

The classic articulation of how customary international law
comes into existence is found in a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court only a few years after Rauseher. In The Paquette
Habana,60 Justice Gray,6 ' writing for the Court, described the
process by which coastal fishing vessels became exempt from capture as prizes of war as "an ancient usage among civilized nations,
beginning centuries ago and gradually ripening into a rule of in-

ternational

law." 6 2

Later in the opinion he made it clear that such

a rule must be demonstrated by "the general consent of the civiThe statutory premise was also less than airtight. The 1848 and 1869 statutes
arguably relate only to protecting the accused in cases where extradition is granted and do
not affect the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Cf. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 678 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Semmelman, supra note 26, at 107 n.255.
56. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
EXTRADITION To AND) FROM THE UNITED STATES:

OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT

TREATIES 31-33 (2007), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf.
57. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 825 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (2006)). The
only difference between the current statute and the one quoted in Rauscher is that the
phrase "crimes and offenses" now reads "offenses." See United States Rev. Stat. § 5275.
58. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 678 (interpreting Rauscher to mean that "two federal
statutes .. . imposed the doctrine of specialty upon extradition treaties to which the United
States was a party"); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1987) ("No
warrant of extradition issued in this case. Consequently, the sole limitation arguably
placed by this statute on Molina-Chacon's prosecution is that he face trial only for offenses
of which he is 'duly accused."'); Fiocconi, 462 F. 2d at 482.
59. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
60. Paqusette Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
61. Interestingly, Justice Gray, who was on the Rauscher Court, only concurred in that
case on the ground that the rule of specialty was embodied in the two federal statutes.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 433. As to the broader question whether the rule existed "independ.
ently of any act of congress, and in the absence of any affirmative restriction in the treaty,"
Justice Gray was "not satisfied that that is a question of law, within the cognizance of the
judicial tribunals, as contradistinguished from a question of international comity and usage." Id.
62. Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. at 686.
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lized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty
or other public act."163 Measured by these standards, there is little
if any evidence which supports Justice Miller's conclusion in
Rauscher that in 1842 specialty was "the recognized public law
which had prevailed in the absence of treaties" and from which the
64
Webster-Ashburton Treaty "did not intend to depart."
First of all, very few extraditions involving the United States
had taken place prior to 1842. There was one prominent case under the 1788 Consular Convention between France and the United
States, 65 which required the surrender of deserting sailors, in
which the Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus
66
compelling a district court judge to issue a warrant of surrender.
The France-United States Consular Convention was abrogated by

Congress in

1798.67

The 1794 Jay Treaty with Great Britain 68 contained the first
"full-fledged extradition provision" relating to the surrender of
fugitives who had committed ordinary crimes. 69 In 1799 the extradition of a U.S. citizen to Great Britain for a murder committed
aboard a British vessel sparked a constitutional controversy that
contributed to John Adams' defeat in his bid for a second term as
president 70 and resulted in a cessation of U.S. extraditions for
more than forty years. 71

63. Id. at 677.
64. Raztscher, 119 U.S. at 420. See also Semmelman, supra note 26, at 105-06 (arguing
that "Miller's assertion that the Treaty 'did not intend to depart . .. from the recognized
public law' assumed, incorrectly, that specialty had been such a principle in 1842 when the
treaty was made.") (quoting Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.33).
65. Convention Between His Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America
for the Purpose of Defining and Establishing the Functions and Privileges of their Respective Consuls and Vice-Consuls, U.S.-Fr., art. IX, Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. 106, abrogated by
Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578. This convention was the first entered into by the
U.S. which required the surrender of fugitives, albeit it was not a full blown extradition
agreement. See John T. Parry, The Lost History of InternationalExtradition Litigation, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 93, 105 (2002).
66. United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795) (per curiam). For a discussion
of the significance of the case, see Parry, supra note 65, at 105-08.
67. Parry, supra note 65, at 105 n.58.
68. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between His Britannic Majesty and the
United States of America, U.S. -Gr. Brit., art. XXVII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter
Jay's Treaty].
69. Parry, supra note 65, at 108.
70. Semmelman, supra note 26, at 92. For detailed descriptions of the infamous Robins
case, see Reforming International Extradition, supra note 1, at 391-97; Parry, supra note
65, at 108-14.
71. Parry, supra note 65, at 114. The extradition provision of Jay's Treaty lapsed in
1806. Id. at 114 n.111.
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Neither of these early cases involved the rule of specialty.
Therefore, given the paucity of U.S. extraditions in the period
from 1789 to 1842, it is impossible to conclude that the United
States had any general practice regarding specialty prior to that
time. 72
There is a similar lack of evidence supporting the existence of
the rule in the practice of other countries. As has been noted
above, extraditions for ordinary criminal offenses were almost unheard of before the eighteenth century. 73 And though the practice
grew rapidly after that 74 specialty did not become a feature of ex-

tradition treaties until

185075

and the first U.S. agreement con-

taining such a provision was entered into in 1868.76 Where then
did Justice Miller find the evidence of the "general consent" of nations independent of "any express treaty or other public act" necessary to support the existence of a customary law rule of specialty? The answer is that he relied on the "doctrine of publicists

and writers on international

law."177

An examination of these authorities 78 reveals that not only do
they generally not support Justice Miller's conclusion that specialty was customary international law but in some instances suggest quite the opposite. 79 First, it should be noted that none of the
72. For example, Lawrence quotes correspondence he received from Mr. O'Conor, the
district attorney who handled the Heilbronn case. William Beach Lawrence, Extradition,
15 ALB. L.J. 224, 225 (1877). Heilbronn was extradited from the United States to Great
Britain in the 1850's and it is one of the cases cited by the United States during the Lawrence and Winslow controversy because Heilbronn was thereafter prosecuted in England
for an offense for which he was not extradited. Letter of Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr.
Hoffman (May 22, 1876), in DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 773. Mr.
O'conor told Lawrence that he had considered asking the British for a guarantee that
Heilbronn would not be prosecuted for any other offenses but apparently chose not to do so.
Lawrence, supra, at 225. Significantly, O'conor considered making such a demand "with.
out any conception that exacting the pledge could be regarded as a failure to conform to the
treaty," observing that "there never was much practice under these extradition treaties,
and attention was never drawn . . . to this possible abuse in acting under them until the
British act of 1870." Id.
73. Blakesley, supra note 16, at 50.
74. Blakesley counted 92 extradition treaties that were entered into between 1718 and
1830. Id. at 50 n.48.
75. Id. at 52.
76. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 194.
77. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 419.
78. These writers were described by one author as being of "modest authority." Jona-

than A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machamn, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 939, 946 n.41 (1993).
79. Cf. id. at 946 ("Rauscher rested on unsure legal foundations when decided, endorsing an allegedly widespread principle of the law of nations for which only mixed support
actually existed and which the United States government vigorously opposed."); See
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 415-31.
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authorities cited by the Court squarely addresses the question
whether specialty was a rule of customary international law in
1842 when the Webster-Ashburton Treaty took effect. In 1884,
Spear, whose examination of the law of extradition was, according
to Miller, "so full and careful that it leaves nothing to be desired in
the way of presentation of authorities," 80 wrote that "there is not
now in Europe, if there ever were, any international law of extradition beyond that which treaties create and prescribe."18 ' Clarke
described the Extradition Act of 1870, which introduced specialty
into British law, as correcting "serious defects" in British extradition law, including that "[n]either the then existing treaties nor
the Acts of Parliament, by which they had been put in force, contained . .. any provision preventing the trial of a fugitive when
once surrendered for offences other than that for which his rendition had been claimed."82 An anonymous article in the American
Law Review discussing the Winslow case, purportedly written by
Judge Lowell of the U.S. District Court in Boston, 83 limits its endorsement of the rule to those cases where "a person [is] surrendered by one sovereign to another, under a treaty of extradition." 84
And Field's Outlines of an International Code finds its support for
the rule in the 1868 Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Italy,85 the first U.S. extradition agreement to contain such a
provision. 86 That leaves only one of the cited authors, William
Beach Lawrence, who does come close to supporting Justice
Miller's conclusion that specialty was customary international
law.
In 1876-77, Lawrence wrote three letters which were published
in the Albany Law Journal. 87 The first, which was a critique of
the position the United States had taken in the Lawrence and
Winslow cases, 88 is the only one that squarely addressed the
80. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 417.
81. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-STATE 4
(3d ed. 1885).
82. EDWARD CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 162 (3d ed. 1888).
This is a later edition of the same work cited by Justice Miller. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at
417.
83. See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 416.
84. Note, Winslow's Case, 10OAm. L. REV. 617, 618 (1875).
85. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, OUTLINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE § 237 n.1 (2d ed.
1876).
86. 1 MOORE, supra note 22.
87. See Lawrence, supra note 16; Lawrence, supra note 77; Lawrence, supra note 34.
88. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 85 ('The view [regarding the Winslow case] taken by
the United States being, as I conceived,. ...at variance with the text of the treaty as con-
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status of the rule of specialty as international law. It contained a
detailed analysis of the history of extradition in general and, more
specifically, the practices of the United States, Great Britain and
France. 89 To be sure, there are scattered statements in this article
from which one might argue that it endorsed the position that
specialty was a rule of public international law apart from the
stipulations in any particular extradition treaty. 90 Taken as a
whole, however, the thrust of Lawrence's arguments is that extradition is a practice regulated by treaties, and that specialty is implicit in any treaty that enumerates the offenses for which one
may be extradited. For example, he wrote:
[A]ll the right which a power asking an extradition can possibly derive from the surrender must be what is expressed in
the treaty and that all rules of interpretation require the
treaty to be strictly construed; and consequently where the
treaty prescribes the offenses for which extradition can be
made and the particular testimony to be required, . . the
State receiving the fugitive has no jurisdiction whatever over
him, except for the specified crime to which the testimony applies.91
Thus, even according to the authorities relied upon by Justice
Miller, it was not, as he stated, "very clear" that specialty was a
"recognized public law which had prevailed in the absence of treaties."192
C.

The Status of the Rule of Specialty in 1886

Nonetheless, there is a credible theory that specialty was a nontreaty based feature of international law, at least by the time the
Rauscher case was decided. 93 According to that theory, specialty is
implicit in the right of asylum. Put another way, the asylum state
surrenders the defendant to the requesting state to be prosecuted
strued by the recognized rules of interpretation and the laws of both countries passed to
give effect to treaties of extradition .
89. Id. at 85-98.
90. See, e.g., id. at 93 ("1 have found no American treaty, which provides in terms that
the extradited individual shall not be tried for any offense for which he was not extradited.
This may be owing to its being supposed to be provided for by the law of nations . . .
91. Id. at 96.
92. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
93. Some scholars have accepted the conclusion that specialty was a rule of customary
law by the time Rauscher was decided, even if they question its status in 1842 when the
treaty went into effect. See, e.g., Semmelman, supra note 26, at 105.
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only for the offense or offenses as to which extradition is granted. 94
Consequently, as to any other offenses the defendant may have
committed, the defendant still has asylum.95 To the extent that
such a non-treaty based rule existed as a matter of customary law,
however, it related only to the prohibition against prosecuting for
political offenses as to which asylum had been granted. 96
Whether that prohibition had been extended to ordinary offenses as well depends upon whether there was a non-treaty based
duty to extradite for ordinary offenses. Because if there had never
been such a duty, then specialty, as it pertains to ordinary crimes,
is solely a matter of treaty law. 97 And while it is not impossible for
a treaty-based rule to become a rule of customary international
law, 98 in order for this to happen the rule must be supported by
some state practice that indicates that states regard themselves as
obligated to follow the rule apart from a treaty obligation to do
50 99

94. Lawrence, supra note 34, at 363. Justice Miller hinted at this rationale:
A moment before he is under the protection of a government which has afforded him
an asylum from which he can only be taken under a very limited form of procedure,
and a moment after he is found in the possession of another sovereignty by virtue of
that proceeding, but divested of all the rights which he had the moment before, and of
all the rights which the law governing that proceeding was intended to secure.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 421.
95. See Lawrence, supra note 34, at 363 (stating that "the person surrendered is to be
deemed still legally in the country from which he was extradited"). This must account for
the feature of the rule of specialty that allows the defendant the opportunity to return to
the asylum state before he can be prosecuted for any other pre-extradition offenses.
96. See Letter from Lord Derby to Mr. Hoffman (May 4, 1876), in FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 29, at 227. The letter stated as follows:
There is no principle of international law more clearly admitted than that advanced
by you [that] with regard to the right of asylum for political offenses, it is clear that
the nation surrendering is to be the judge of what is or is not a political offense, the
more so because opinions differ in different countries on this question.
Id. Indeed, one of the major fears, as the practice of extradition for ordinary crimes developed, was that states would use it has a subterfuge to get jurisdiction over someone who
had committed a political offense. See id.
97. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 26 (6th
ed. 1987).
98. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41
(Feb. 20) (observing that "[tihere is no doubt that this process ... constitutes indeed one of
the recognized methods by which new rules of customary law may be formed").
99. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43 ("From their [states party to the
treaty] action [in conformity with the treaty rule] no inference could legitimately be drawn
as to the existence of a rule of customary international law in favour of the [treaty rule].").
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British Practice

There were some broad assertions by British officials that specialty was a feature of customary law. 100 Those statements must
be discounted because Great Britain did not recognize a nontreaty based duty to extradite. 101 This is borne out by the way the
British actually behaved towards the rule because their actions
strongly suggest that they regarded specialty as if it were a rule of
comity, and not as if it were customary law. For example, if the
rule was already customary law at the time of the Winslow case,
why did the British ask for a guarantee that the United States
would not violate it?102 Why too did the British consider violation
of the rule only as a ground for suspending the treaty 103 rather
than an international wrong? 104 And why, if the rule was so well
established that neither England nor France would think of violating even if there were no treaty provision to that effect, did the
Extradition Act of 1870 require proof that the law of the foreign
state included the rule of specialty or that there had been an

100. For example, Sir Thomas Henry, the British magistrate who handled the Lawrence
case (1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 202), in a Letter (Jan. 4, 1876) to A.F.O. Liddell of the
British Home Office wrote:
So fully is this principle recognized, that it is scrupulously observed by every European Government, whether there is any stipulation in the Treaty to that effect or not;
in the Treaty between England and France there is no stipulation on the subject, but
neither country would think of trying a fugitive for a crime different from that for
which he was surrendered.
CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING ExTRADITION To BOTHi HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY 44 (1876).
Henry's statement, rather than being a broad assertion of a non-treaty based rule of
specialty, see Semmelman, sutpra note 26, at 84-85, can also be read to mean that specialty
is implicit in extradition treaties that enumerate extradition offenses. Henry's views undoubtedly influenced the inclusion of the rule of specialty in the Extradition Act of 1870
since, according to Clarke, "the country is indebted chiefly [to him]" for its passage.
CLARKE, supra note 82, at 161.
101. CLARKE, supra note 82, at 161.
102. See supra p.5.
103. See, e.g., The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 33 ("A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the
other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.").
104. Compare Letter of Lord Derby to Mr. Hoffman (May 4, 1876), in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 230 ("[Her Majesty's government] have always regarded the claim
so as to try him as a breach of the treaty of 1842" . .. and can only express their deep regret
that the operation of a treaty . . .should be in danger of being so unnecessarily terminated.") with Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the
PersistentObjector in InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985) ("subsequent departures from the standard of conduct required by the rule [of customary law] constitute international wrongs").
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agreement to that effect? 05 Such guarantees would have been
unnecessary if the rule were already customary international
law. 106 And, why did the Rauscher case itself apparently spark no
protest from the British? 10 71 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a Royal Commission, appointed in 1877 to consider amending British extradition laws, wrote: "A question presents itself
whether, if a person be surrendered in respect of one extradition
offense, he should, when transferred to the country claiming him,
be liable to be tried for another. Political and local offenses being
excepted, we see no reason why he should not."108 Clearly the
Commission could not have reached this conclusion if specialty
were viewed as a binding rule of customary international law.
2.

French Practice

The situation in France was somewhat different. There, the
surrender of fugitives was an inherent right of the king based on a
"natural duty' under international law, either to extradite or
prosecute fugitives, from one state's justice, who are found within
another state's borders." 09 Grotius, one of the classical scholars
105. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52 (Eng.); Ex Parte Bouvier, 27 L.T. 844
(Q.B. 1872), reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 29, at 615-16 (extradition to
France depended upon proof that specialty was a feature of French law).
106. See supra note 97.
107. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The lack of a British protest is significant because the resumption of treaty relations after Lawrence-Winslow was, from the
British perspective, contingent upon the United States keeping its promise not to violate
the rule. Supra note 47 and accompanying text. And, the British concern that the United
States keep its part of the bargain was made apparent in several post-Winslow cases. See 1
MOORE, supra note 22, at 222-33 and cases discussed therein. In the first post-Winslow
case, Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, after being advised that friends of the fugitive had informed the Governor-General of Canada that the extradition was being sought so that
Kentucky could prosecute an offense that was not in the treaty, Secretary Fish wrote to the
Governor of Kentucky urging him to make a bona fide effort to convict the defendant of the
extradition offense before proceeding on any other charges. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 223
n. 1.
One post-Winslow/pre-Rauscher case, In re Miller, 23 F. 32 (W.D. Pa. 1885), involved the extradition of a prisoner who had escaped while serving a seven year sentence
for burglary and fled to Canada. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 229. Because burglary was
not an extraditable offense, Miller was extradited on new charges of robbery and assault
with intent to commit murder, although this was merely a pretext to obtain his return since
he was never prosecuted for those charges. Id. at 230. Apparently there was no protest
either by Britain or Canada, since the question whether the extradition was obtained in
"good faith" might have been raised before the Canadian courts, but "having been surrendered, it was not for [Miller] to raise the question of good faith before the tribunals of his
own country." Id. at 230-31.
108. Report of the British Royal Commission 1878, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 267, 273 (New York, Kraus 1966) (1878).
109. Blakesley, supra note 16, at 53.
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who shared this view, made it clear, however, that this duty was
unencumbered by any rule of specialty: "But the surrendering
with which we here have to do is nothing more than the entrusting of a citizen to the power of another state, for it to decide about
him as it may wish.""10
In any event, it is likely that what was termed a "natural duty"
to extradite was really only an act of international comity. Billot,
the leading nineteenth century French scholar on extradition,"' is
quoted by Professor Blakesley as having written that "it is 'an established principle that extradition may be authorized in the absence of a treaty."' 2 The use of the word "may" strongly suggests
that there is a discretionary right to extradite absent a treaty that
is not binding as a legal obligation would be. Moreover, the obligation under French law existed only on the "basis of reciprocity,"
113

which is more characteristic of a rule of comity,"14 than it is of a

rule of law, which is universally binding." 65 And, according to the
seminal French case, the right of the king to extradite without a
treaty was expressly "derive[d] from his birth and by virtue of
which he maintains relations of comity with neighboring
States.""16
There are other good reasons for concluding that at the time
Rauscher was decided the rule of specialty with respect to ordinary crimes was a feature of treaty law, even in France. The rule
first appeared in a circular distributed by the French Minister of
Justice in 1841.117 The circular was issued to resolve the case of
Dermenon, who had been extradited from Switzerland on a charge
of fraudulent bankruptcy. After he was acquitted of that charge,

110. H. GROTIUS, II DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIs 529 (Francis W. Kelsey, trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (1646) (emphasis added). It should be noted that Grotius believed that extradition for ordinary crimes was limited to those of which the defendant had already been convicted. Id. at 527 n.1, 529.
111. Lawrence deemed Billot's treatise on extradition "the best work on the subject now
extant." Lawrence, supra note 16, at 93. Both Lawrence and Moore relied on Billot for the
proposition that specialty was a rule of customary international law. See id. at 93-94; 1
MOORE, supra note 22, at 217-19.
112. Blakesley, supra note 16, at 53 (quoting ALBERT BILLOT, TRAMTt DE L'EXTRADITION
259 (1874))
113. Id. at 54.
114. Paul B. Stephan, Treaty and Domestic Law After Medellin v. Texas, 13 Lewis &
Clark L. Rev. 11, 18 (2009) ("Comity, in other words, is a two-way street: A state can give
effect to a foreign legal act or not depending on the behavior of the lawmaker that promulgated that act.").
115. Stein, supra note 105, at 458.
116. Blakesley, supra note 16, at 54 (emphasis added) (quoting Judgment of Jun. 30,
1827, Cour de Cassation, 52 BuLL. DE CASSATION (CRIMINEL) 541 (1827)).
117. Note, Winslow's Case, supra note 84, at 618-19; Semmelman, supra note 26, at 81.
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there was an attempt to prosecute him for some other offense as to
which extradition had not been granted. The Minister ordered
that he be released:
It is clear that in that case his extradition could not have been
obtained. It follows that we cannot take advantage of his having been given up to the French authorities upon a different
ground to try him for acts which have not and could never
have been the grounds of his extradition. 18
The circular referred specifically to four countries with which
France then had extradition treaties, including Switzerland, and
it asserted that France could obtain extradition from countries
with which it did not have extradition treaties, except for the
United States and Great Britain."19 Nevertheless, the circular is
not an example of state practice supporting the existence of a rule
of specialty in the absence of a treaty. Instead, because France
had an extradition treaty with Switzerland in 1841, it is a statement of French practice pursuant to the treaty. And, since then,
as Professor Blakesley has observed, "[a]lthough authority exists
in France for allowing extradition in the absence of a treaty, the
extradition treaty has been the most constant source of developing
extradition law." 120
3.

The Rest of Europe

Beyond England and France, the status of the rule in the rest of
Europe appears to have been more uncertain than some of the
statements regarding it might suggest. 2 1 Near the end of the
eighteenth century, Professor Lammasch of the University of Vienna was the reporter for a study by the Institute of International
Law that investigated whether to revise article 26 of its Oxford
Resolutions of 1880.122 One of the questions put to those surveyed

118. SPEAR, supra note 81, at 75, (quoting Circular of the Minister of Justice, April 5,
1841).
119. CLARKE, supra note 82, at 180. Lawrence viewed the circular as "an explanation
not only of the English and American treaties with [France], under the influence of which
they were negotiated, but of our treaty with England in pari materia, and made contemporaneously." Lawrence, supra note 16, at 90.
120. Blakesley, supranote 16, at 54.
121. See supra note 100.
122. RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (James Brown Scott
ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) (1916). Article 26 of the Oxford Resolutions of 1880
is quoted in 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 234-36 n.1: "An extradited person ought to be
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was: "Ought an extradited person be permitted to avail himself of
the circumstance that the treaty or act in virtue of which he was
delivered up does not permit him to be prosecuted or punished for
an act other than that which formed the ground of his surrender?" 23 Representatives of Germany, Belgium, France and England reported that while the laws of their countries contained a
version of the rule of specialty, none permitted the accused to
raise the issue of compliance with the rule in court. 24 Sweden
and Norway simply answered the question, "no," while Russia was
imprecise, and "[m]ost of those addressed expressed no opinion as
to what the law ought to be." 125 On March 27, 1894, the Institute
adopted a resolution to revise article 26, which provided that an
individual may object to her prosecution based on violations of
"the prescriptions of treaties, laws of the requesting country relative to extradition, and the very instrument of extradition," making no reference to a rule of customary international law. 26 If
customary law limiting the right to prosecute existed, why was it
not listed as a ground for objection?
Thus there are strong reasons for questioning the Rauscher
Court's conclusion that specialty was a rule of customary international law.' 27 But even if Rauscher was somehow right in its finding that specialty was customary international law, the United
States should not be bound by it because it consistently maintained that the rule did not apply to it,128 and "a state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures." 29
permitted to oppose as a preliminary objection, before the tribunal called upon to judge him
definitely, the irregularity of the conditions under which his extradition was accorded."
123. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 234-36 n.l.
124. If England had truly viewed the rule of specialty as customary law, then it would
have been enforceable in the English courts because, unlike treaty law, custom does not
require a parliamentary act of incorporation. AKEHURST, supra note 97, at 44-45.
125. 1 MOORE, supra note 22, at 234-36 n.l.
126. RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 122, at 111.
127. In any event, it would appear that this aspect of the Rauscher decision was merely
obiter dictum since the result was based solely on the interpretation of the treaty and not
on customary law. See Semmelman, supra note 26, at 107 n.255 (stating that "The decision
[in Rauscher] rested entirely upon the Treaty"). Obiter dictum is defined as "[a] judicial
comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1177 (9th ed. 2009))
128. See, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text
129. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102 cmt. d; see also Stein, supra note 104, at 457
("According to that principle, a state that has persistently objected to a rule of customary
international law during the course of the rule's emergence is not bound by the rule.").
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IV. IS U.S. POST-BA USCHER PRACTICE CONSISTENT WITH
SPECIALTY AS A RULE OF CUSTOMARY LAw?

Nevertheless, some contemporary authorities seem to have ratified Rauscher by accepting specialty's status as customary law.' 30
And while it is certainly possible that specialty has achieved that
status since Raisscher, in order to do so the rule must be followed
independently of any treaty obligation, because merely following a
treaty obligation does not demonstrate the opinio juris'3 ' necessary to support the existence of a rule of customary international
law.' 32 And while it is also possible to deduce the existence of a
rule of customary law from its appearance in parallel provisions in
bilateral treaties, Professor Brownlie has warned that "considerable caution is necessary in evaluating treaties for this purpose." 3
In this regard Professor Akehurst's observations about the rule
against extraditing political offenders 34 seem equally applicable
to the rule of specialty:
[T]reaties can be evidence of customary law; but great care
must be taken when inferring rules of customary law from
treaties. For instance, treaties dealing with a particular subject-matter may habitually contain a certain provision; thus,
extradition treaties almost always provide that political offenders shall not be extradited. It has sometimes been argued
that a standard provision of this type has become so habitual
130. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 430; see also Semnmelman, supra note 26, at 79 n.49.
Some of the sources cited by Semnmelman do not unambiguously endorse the notion that
specialty is a rule of customary international law. For example, Professor Brownlie states
that specialty is a "general principle of international law," which has been abstracted by
courts "from existing treaties and municipal provisions." BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 316.
Brownlie defines general principles as those common to all or nearly all domestic legal
systems. Id. at 15-16. Professor Blakesley describes specialty as a "virtually universal
principle." which it is in treaty-based extradition practice. Blakesley, supra note 3, at 706.
Moreover, it is evident that this is the usage Blakesley intended because a few pages later
he also observes that "specialty apparently does not apply in the United States for cases of
rendition by means other than extradition pursuant to treaty." Id. at 708; see also Shapiro
v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
Semmelman also cites Shapiro. Semmelman, supra note 26, at 79 n.49.
131. "Custom is generally considered to have two elements: state practice and opinio
juris. State practice refers to general and consistent practice by states, while opinio juris
means that the practice is followed out of a belief of legal obligation." Anthea Elizabeth
Roberts, T1raditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law, 95 Am. J.
INT'L L. 757, 757 (2001).
132. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 43-44.
133. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 13-14.
134. See Blakesley, supra note 16, at 51-52.
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that it should be regarded as a rule of customary law, to be inferred even when a treaty is silent on that particular point.
On the other hand, why would states bother to insert such
standard provisions in the treaties if the rule existed already
as a rule of customary law? 8 5
The Restatement agrees, unequivocally stating that "the network of treaties has not created a principle of customary law requiring extradition . .. and it is accepted that states are not required to extradite except as obligated to do so by treaty." 36
Nonetheless, there may still be a customary law rule of specialty
if such a rule is applied as a matter of legal obligation in nontreaty based extraditions. 3 7 To determine whether current U.S.
practice supports that conclusion, it is necessary to analyze the
U.S. cases involving non-treaty based renditions.
A.

Kidnappings and Abductions

The rule has never been applied to extra-legal renditions of fugitives from foreign countries to the United States. In Ker v. liinois,' 38 decided the same day as Rauscher and also authored by
Justice Miller, the defendant, who had been kidnapped in Peru
and returned to the United States, argued that the rule of spe-

135. AKEHURSP, supra note 97, at 26. If anything, there is a much stronger argument
that the political offense exception is a rule of customary law apart from its almost universal inclusion in extradition treaties. See supra pp. 14-15.
136. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at 557:
At one time it was thought that according to the law and usage of civilized nations,
every state was obliged to grant extradition freely and without qualification or restriction, or to punish a wrongdoer itself. By the latter part of the nineteenth century
that view had yielded to the view that delivery of persons charged with, or convicted
of, crimes in another state was at most a moral duty, not required by customary international law, but generally governed by treaty and subject to various limitations.
A network of bilateral treaties, differing in detail but having considerable similarity
in principle and scope, has spelled out these limitations, and in conjunction with
state legislation, practice, and judicial decisions has created a body of law with substantial uniformity in major respects. But the network of treaties has not created a
principle of customary law requiring extradition (cf. § 102, Comment i), and it is accepted that states are not required to extradite except as obligated to do so by treaty.

Id.
137. The Restatement describes the doctrine of specialty as a rule found in "most international agreements, state laws and state practice," omitting any reference to customary
international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 477. It does not address the question
whether specialty is a binding rule absent a treaty obligation. Id. By contrast, with regard
to the political offense exception, the Restatement specifically states that it "reflects the
practice of states that extradite without a treaty." Id. § 476 cmt. g.
138. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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cialty barred his prosecution. 139 Justice Miller made it quite clear
that specialty applied only to treaty-based extraditions because
Ker was "clothed with no rights a proceeding under the treaty
could have given him," so that Ker's rendition violated "no duty
which this country owes to Peru or him under the treaty." 140 The
result was not without irony, as one commentator has so aptly
observed:
Collectively, Ker and Rauscher established that a defendant,
brought to the United States from abroad for prosecution,
may not be prosecuted for crimes for which he has not been
surrendered-except when he has not been surrendered for
any crime, in which case he may be prosecuted for every
crime. 141

A little over a hundred years later, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to repair this embarrassing incoherency in U.S. extradition law. In United States v. Alvarez-Machai, 42 the Court
considered whether a court was deprived of jurisdiction over a defendant who had been kidnapped in Mexico at the behest of the
United States and returned to California to stand trial. 43 There
were differences between Ker and Alvarez-Machain. First, there
was apparently no governmental involvement in the kidnapping
in Ker, whereas the Drug Enforcement Administration had orchestrated the kidnapping of Alvarez-Macham. 44 And second,
Ker was an American national, while Alvarez-Machamn was a citizen of Mexico.' 45 The Alvarez-Machain Court did not find these
differences persuasive, 46 even though the Ker Court found it signficant that the kidnapping was "without any pretense of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United
States," 147 and labeled Ker's argument that a foreign national who
139. Ker, 199 U.S. at 443.
140. Id. Compare id. with Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422, which stated:
[Ilt is impossible to conceive of the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case for any other
purpose than that mentioned in the treaty, and ascertained by the proceeding under
which the party is extradited, without an implication of fraud upon the rights of the

party extradited, and of bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition.
Id. (emphasis added).
141. Semmelman, supra note 26, at 113.
142. Alvarez-Machamn, 504 U.S. 655.
143. Id. at 657.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
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is a fugitive from justice acquires a right to asylum an "absurdity."148 Unlike Ker, Alvarez-Machamn was not a fugitive in Mexico
claiming the right of asylum. Rather, his argument was that the
extradition treaty between the U.S. and Mexico was the only way
for one country to obtain criminal jurisdiction over the nationals of
the other. 149 Rejecting this contention, the Court extended Ker to
any case where a U.S. court obtained jurisdiction over a defendant
by extra-legal means, 150 and even when there is an extradition
treaty between the two countries, the rule of specialty does not
apply.15 '
B.

Comity and Waiver

Ker and Alvarez-Machain do not, however, deal with the situation where jurisdiction is obtained legally but outside the parameters of an extradition treaty, such as when a defendant is surrendered as a matter of comity or waives extradition. This can occur
because, although the U.S. does not extradite in the absence of a
treaty obligation, 52 it does request extraditions from states with

148. Id. at 442.
149. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 663-64. Mexico protested Alvarez-Machamn's abduction but not on the grounds that any prosecution of him in the United States would violate
the rule of specialty. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
Instead Mexico complained that "the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez Machamn and his transfer
from Mexican territory to the United States of America were carried out with the knowledge of persons working for the U.S. government, in violation of the procedure established
in the extradition treaty in force between the two countries." Id. at 604.
150. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669-70.
151. It is strange that Alvarez-Machain did not argue that his prosecution violated the
customary international law rule of specialty, if such a rule existed. See Brief for Respondent, Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (No. 91.712). Instead, respondent's customary law
argument was that his kidnapping violated the international law rule that prohibits one
state from violating the territorial integrity of another. It was in this regard that respondent asserted that the Rauscher Court's statement that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty "did
not intend to deprt... from the recognized public law which had prevailed in the absence
of treaties' . . . merely supports Respondent's view that the Treaty must be read in the
context of the clear international law prohibiting state-sponsored kidnapping." Id. at 26
n.23 (citation omitted).
Nor did Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, base his position on a violation
of the customary law rule of specialty. Rather, Justice Stevens opined that the existence of
an extradition treaty, rather than any customary law rule of specialty, "suffices to protect
the defendant from prosecution despite the absence of any express language in the Treaty
itself purporting to limit this Nation's power to prosecute." Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at
678.
152. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 6, at § 475 cmt. a ("The extradition law of many states, including the United
States ...provides that requests for extradition may be made only pursuant to a treaty.").
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which it does not have a treaty. 153 In such situations, the lower
courts have split on whether to apply the rule of specialty. In line
with Ker and Alvarez-Machamn, some courts view specialty as
solely a treaty-based right that cannot be invoked in any nontreaty based rendition and thus no support for the customary law
argument can be found in these cases. 54 Other courts apply the
rule, but apparently not as a matter of customary law. 155
It is difficult to reconcile the decisions of these courts. The cases
are characterized by broad assertions that the rule is "international law" with little or no analysis or consideration of the implications. This lack of clarity is well illustrated by a trio of Second
Circuit cases. In the first case, Fiocconi u. Attorney General of the
United States, 56 the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of petitioners' writ of habeas corpus, 57 while disavowing its
conclusion that specialty applied only to treaty-based extraditions. 58 Instead, Judge Friendly, writing for the court, character153. Blakesley, supra note 6, at 708 n.193 (noting that when the United States requests
extradition as a matter of comity, "[djocumentation is prepared and forwarded through the
diplomatic channel in the same way it is done for extradition requests pursuant to treaty").
154. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171, 1177-79 (11th Cir.
2009) (holding that a defendant who could not establish that he was surrendered to the
United States pursuant to the U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty could not invoke the rule
of specialty because the rule "applies only to extraditions pursuant to treaty" because "[i]t
was conceived in that context."); United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that where the requested state (Dominica) waived its rights under the
treaty, the defendant's conviction did "not violate the rule of specialty or any other rights
which the defendant is asserting under the treaty"); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308,
310 (9th Cir. 1980) (whether defendant was abducted or "deported" there was no violation
of the U.S.-Thailand extradition treaty; therefore, prosecution did not violate rule of specialty contained in the treaty). United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523, 1528 n.6
(M.D.Fla. 1987) (noting press reports that the Colombia-U.S. Extradition Treaty had been
annulled by the Colombian Supreme Court and observing that if so, "then the rule of specialty would no longer apply. An extradition based on comity is not subject to specialty.").
155. There are a number of treaty-based extradition cases where the rule, despite its
presence in the treaty, is characterized as international comity. See, e.g., Leighnor v.
Thrner, 884 F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1426
(9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Thiron, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1987); but see United States v. GalloChamorro, 48 F.3d 502, 504 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[t~he specialty doctrine is a principle of international law").
156. 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); see also United
States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 979 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (following Fiocconi).
157. Fiocconi v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 339 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
158. The district court, relying on the rationale of Ker, rejected the petitioners' argument
that specialty applied to comity-based extraditions, since "Bauscher is a recognized exception to the general rules of criminal jurisdiction because the defendant there was extradited
under a treaty which foreclosed jurisdiction to try him for offenses other than the one for
which he was extradited. His immunity from prosecution under other charges derived from
the treaty." Fiocconi, 339 F. Supp at 1246. The court of appeals saw it otherwise, stating
that "we cannot agree that the basic principle of Bauscher is inapplicable where extradition
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ized specialty as "a rule of what we would now call United States
foreign relations law devised by the courts to implement the
treaty." 159 For this proposition, he cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 60 which considered
the application of the judicially created "act of state" doctrine' 6 ' to
the nationalization of property by a foreign government [Cuba].' 62
The Sabbatino Court described the act of state doctrine as a rule
not required by international law and specifically stated no claim
had ever been made that a failure to apply the rule constituted "a
breach of [an] international obligation," 6 3 which would be the case
if it were customary law.'164 Accordingly, Fiocconi's conclusion that
specialty applies to comity-based extraditions cannot be read to
mean that such a result is required by international law. 65
Rather, it is a judicial rule designed to promote international comity because "the need for preserving the United States from a
breach of faith is equally [as] strong [as it is in treaty-based extraditions] "166
A year later in Shapiro v. Ferrandina,67 the Second Circuit considered whether a U.S. court could impose specialty on a receiving
state in a case in which the defendant was being extradited from

has been obtained as an exercise of comity by the surrendering government." Fiocconi, 462
F.2d at 479.
159. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479.
160. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
161. The Sabbatino Court quoted the classic formulation of the act of state doctrine:
"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory." 376 U.S. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
162. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 429.
163. Id. at 421-22. The Court stated as follows: 'That international law does not require
application of the doctrine is evidenced by the practice of nations. . ...[Aind apparently no
claim has ever been raised before an international tribunal that failure to apply the act of
state doctrine constitutes a breach of international obligation." Id. (citation omitted).
164. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
arts.
1-3,
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/englishcommentaries/9_6 _2001.pdf.
165. But see United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1007 (5th Cir. 1988) (purportedly
applying Fiocconi to a situation where it was unclear whether the defendants "were extradited, deported, or 'kicked out' of Mexico"). The Kaufman court understood Fiocconi to
mean that "specialty is a general rule of international law which applies with equal force
whether extradition occurs by treaty or comity." Kaufman, 858 F.2d at 1007 n.4 (citing
Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479-80). In this regard, it is clear that the Fifth Circuit misread Fiocconi, which referred to specialty as a rule "devised by the courts" and not as international
law. See supra pp. 2 5-26.
166. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 480.

167. 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973).
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the United States, pursuant to an extradition treaty. 68 Judge
Friendly, again writing for the court, described specialty as having
been "long recognized in international law"' 69 and "[a]s a matter of
international law," 70 statements some have read as an endorsement of the rule as customary international law.'17 ' A closer reading of Shapiro, however, reveals that when Judge Friendly said
that specialty was "recognized in international law," he did not
mean that it was binding customary international law. Instead,
he attributed the binding effect the rule has on U.S. courts to
Rauscher and characterized it as a "self-imposed restraint." And
thus:
[It] need not necessarily imply that in the converse situation,
when the courts of this country are examining an extradition
request from a foreign nation, we should seek to impose limits
on the scope of subsequent prosecution of a person who is to
be extradited for at least one crime in any event. Such a rul-

ing can only be advisory in ca ctr....172
This reasoning is completely incongruous with the notion of customary law as a universally binding legal obligation.
Finally, in United States v. DiTommaso, 7 3 the court summarily
rejected the appellant's argument that his prosecution violated the
rule of specialty in a case where he had waived extradition. In so
holding the court ignored its earlier decision in Fiocconi, which
arguably could have applied to a waiver of extradition. Instead, it
cited a Ninth Circuit case' 74 for the proposition that "subsequent
decisions have narrowly construed the doctrine of specialty by limiting Rauscher's holding to cases involving a formal extradition
pursuant to a treaty." 75
168. The court recognized that the rule, "as a matter of international law" and as reflected in the U.S. -Israel extradition treaty, is "a privilege of the asylum state, designed to
protect its dignity and interests, rather than a right accruing to the accused." Id. at 906.
169. Id. at 905.
170. Id. at 906.
171. See Semmelman, supra note 26, at 79 n.49 (citing Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 905-06).
Semnmelman cites Shapiro, among others, for the proposition that "[pirinciples of customary
international law-such as specialty-are now understood to be binding upon state courts."

Id.
172. Shapiro, 478 F.2d at 906 (emphasis added).
173. 817 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987).
174. See Valot, 625 F.2d at 310 (observing that whether defendant was abducted or
"deported" there was no violation of the United States-Thailand extradition treaty; therefore, prosecution did not violate rule of specialty contained in the treaty).
175. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d at 212.
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So, where does the Second Circuit stand? Is specialty applicable
only in treaty-based extraditions? Or is there an exception to this
rule for comity-based extraditions but not in cases based upon
waiver? Despite these questions, one thing does seem apparent.
Specialty is not viewed by U.S. courts as an obligatory rule of customary international law.
V. CONCLUSIONS

It is unlikely that states have ever treated specialty as a rule of
customary international law international, despite the scholarly
endorsements of it.176 And, even if there once existed a "duty" to
surrender fugitives, 77 by the mid-19th Century it had been replaced by an entirely treaty-based practice. 78 The emergence of
the rule of specialty coincided with this change. 79 Ironically, this
was just about the time that Rauscher was decided, so it is no surprise that Rauscher's dictum stands almost alone in its holding
that the rule was customary law.' 80 The conclusion that specialty
is not customary law is reinforced by U.S. practice, both before
and after Rauscher, which has consistently been that the rule applies only when there is an express stipulation in the treaty to
that effect.' 8 '
The U.S. position has always made sense. The rule of specialty
can exact a substantial cost when it bars prosecution for an offense for which the defendant was not extradited. In those cases,
the defendant receives a "get out of jail free card" merely because
he was lucky enough to be arrested in a country that could not or
176. Bush, supra note 78, at 946 n.41 (noting that "the better view of Rauscher is that it
rested on weak foundations and stands for the proposition that the publicists' idealized
customary law may outweigh the consistent practice of the United States and other nations"); Roberts, supra note 132, at 760 ("Sir Robert Jennings insists that 'most of what we
perversely persist in calling customary international law is not only not customary law; it
does not even faintly resemble a customary law."').
177. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
178. See suspra note 137 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. Indeed in one of the first post-Rauscher cases, the Court, again interpreting the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, abandoned Rauscher's customary law rationale entirely and
relied exclusively on the treaty as a source for the rule of specialty. Johnson v. Browne, 205
U.S. 309, 317 (1907) (describing Rausher as holding "that there was such a limitation [spe.
cialty], and it was to be found in the 'manifest scope and object of the treaty itself'); cf.
Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 514-15 (1916) (noting that "if only one [offense] is extraditable by the treaty, this does not render appellant's detention unlawful, since it is not to
be presumed that the demanding government will suffer him to be tried or punished for
any offense other than that for which he is surrendered, in violation of article 3 of the
treaty of 1889 [with Great Britain.]").
181. See supra pp. 21-28.

Winter 2010

Winte
Abandoning
2010
the Rule of Specialty

229

would not extradite him for an offense he had committed prior to
his extradition. This runs counter to the strongly held view in the
United States that courts are not deprived of jurisdiction over offenses merely because of the circumstances which led to obtaining
jurisdiction over the defendant. 82 Consequently, because the
stakes are high, substantial judicial resources are expended in
litigation over whether the rule of specialty applies or not. 83
Additionally, the rule no longer serves any significant purpose.
It was originally devised to ensure that extradition for an ordinary
crime was not used as a pretense to prosecute political offenders
who had a right to asylum in the surrendering country. 84 Because the proscription against prosecuting for political offenses is
ubiquitous in modern extradition treaties, specialty is no longer
necessary to achieve that purpose. 85 It is also not necessary to
protect the right of asylum, since asylum is not afforded to ordinary criminals. 86 And, finally, any legitimate concerns that the
surrendering country might have that a prosecution in the United
States would violate a defendant's rights or injure the interests of
the surrendering country are better served by a specific agreement
entered into prior to the time the defendant is surrendered. 87
It is also clear that specialty does not protect any fundamental
rights that a criminal defendant might have because, if it did, the
rule would also be applied in extraditions between the states of

182. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (stating that the
Supreme Court "had never departed from the rule announced in [Ker]" and observing that
these cases "rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in
court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and
after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards."), rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952); see also Valot, 625 F.2d at 309 (quoting United States v. Lovato,
520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[Amn unbroken line of cases in this circuit [holds] that
forcible return to the jurisdiction of the United States constitutes no bar to prosecution once
the defendant is found within the United States."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975)).
183. See, e.g., Annotation, Right to Try One for an Offense Other than that Named In
Extradition Proceedings, 21 A.L.R. 1405 (1922) [hereinafter Right to Try].
184. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 56, at 6.8.
186. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1M, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing
Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 257, 320-21 (2001)
(stating that "the Refugee Convention restricts the right of states to engage in peremptory
exclusion to common criminals that the asylum country would agree to extradite").
187. Because the rule of specialty is viewed as inadequate to protect defendants' rights,
this is already the recommended practice in death penalty cases where surrendering states
do have substantial interests in insuring that the death penalty is not carried out. See

Speedy Rice & Ren6e Luke, U.S. Courts, the Death Penalty and the Doctrine of Specialty:
Enforcement in the Heart of Darkness, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1061, 1094.95 (2002).
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the United States. Instead, the contrary rule prevails. 88 So, specialty does not meet Professor Bassiouni's criterion that the rules
applied in extradition cases should be "consistent with the application of the same norms and standards the judiciary must apply

in ordinary criminal cases."' 8 9

In fact, it may be that in many cases the criminal defendant's
interests would be better served if all the charges against him
were resolved at one time. Instead, he is faced with a Hobson's
choice of sorts. Either waive the protection offered by specialty or
leave the jurisdiction within a reasonable period of time. If he
does not do so, he then may be prosecuted even for those offenses
otherwise barred by the rule of specialty. 190 This aspect of the rule
smacks of a sort of gamesmanship that is somewhat unseemly.
Finally, the rule is offensive to current notions of human rights
in at least two ways. First, it perversely incentivizes extra-legal
renditions because in those cases the rule does not apply. As a
result, there are cases, like Alvarez-Machain, where agents of the
U.S. government plot to violate the laws of another country and
engage in criminal acts in order to gain custody of a fugitive.' 9'
Jettisoning the rule would reduce the temptation to engage in extra-legal renditions because defendants would be in the same position vis-A-vis prosecution for prior offenses, whether jurisdiction
was obtained by extradition or by other means. 92
Specialty also denigrates individual human rights because it requires a defendant to leave the jurisdiction to which he has been
surrendered in order to avoid prosecution. In cases where U.S.
nationals are surrendered to the United States, the result is effectively the same as if the defendant had been banished, a practice
which the Supreme Court has unequivocally condemned as a violation of basic human rights. 93 While, to be sure, in specialty
188. Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537 (1893); Right to Try, supra note 183.
189. Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 401.
190. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (allegations that
defendant in drug case was kidnapped and tortured at behest of U.S. drug agents). Moreover, government regulations do not ban these tactics. The United States Attorneys' Man.
ual requires only that prosecutors obtain "advance approval by the Department of Justice"
before resorting to an "extraordinary rendition." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
at
available
15.610,
§
MANUAL,
ATT'ORNEYS
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousafoiareading-oomusamtitle9/15mcrm.htm#9-15.61.
192. Compare supra note 141 and accompanying text.
193. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) ("[B]anishment [is] a fate universally
decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community of democracies."); see also art. 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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cases the defendant leaves as a matter of choice, his fate is not
dissimilar to that of those who are rendered stateless by banishment. Chief Justice Warren described the plight of such individuals in Trop v. Dulles:
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which
he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably as long as he remained
in this country he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien,
no country need do so because he is stateless. Furthermore,
his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be
subject of termination at any time by reason of deportation.
In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.194
Specialty is a rule whose time has passed. It is not mandated
by customary international law, it can stand in the way of an effective resolution of criminal charges in extradition cases, and it
does not effectively protect the fundamental interests of either
extraditing states or of criminal defendants. 195 Accordingly, the
U.S. courts need not and should not apply the rule in any nontreaty based rendition. 196 Eliminating the rule from U.S. extradition treaties presents a far more difficult problem. Nonetheless,
the U.S. should take steps to modify its extradition treaties to
eliminate the rule or at least to reduce the negative effects of its
application. 197 The result will be to take one step toward the more
flexible and efficient system of international cooperation in extradition cases envisioned by Professor Bassiouni.
194. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-102. In Th-op, the Court decided that a statute, which
stripped deserters during a time of war who were dishonorably discharged from the military of their citizenship, violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 103.
195. See Rice & Luke, supra note 188, at 1096:
The biggest problem with the doctrine of specialty is that it has been severely limited
by U.S. court decisions. Decisions by prosecutors and rulings by courts are subject to
public and political pressure. . .. The problems inherent in U.S. court decisions regarding extradition and the doctrine of specialty are numerous. Couple this with the
willingness of U.S. courts to ignore or breach international law, such as the VCCR,
and the surrendering state, along with the extradited defendant, have little left to
protect their rights.

Id.
196. This could occur more frequently than one might imagine since there are over
eighty countries with which the United States does not have extradition treaties. DOYLE,
supra note 56, at 46.
197. See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 56, at 46 (describing liberal waiver provisions included
for the first time in the 2003 revisions of the United States-Great Britain extradition
treaty).

